Lower Numbers, Higher Ambition: Making Falling Migration Work for Growth

Britain may soon be losing more people than it gains – something that has not happened for at least a generation. On Thursday, annual net migration fell to its lowest level since 2012 (excluding the pandemic): from a peak of 944,000 in 2023, the number has collapsed to around 171,000 in 2025. And that is before many of the current government’s restrictions have fully taken effect.

For the government, this will be a political achievement. But lower immigration should be the foundation, not the end point. Otherwise, Britain risks moving from an unsustainable migration boom to a growth-harming restrictive agenda. Voters have never objected to well-managed immigration, to work, study, build businesses or fill genuine gaps – only to the loss of control. Fewer than one in ten Britons think high-skilled immigration should be made more difficult.

With the numbers coming down, the choice now exists to build the pro-growth system that must underpin a capable, reimagined state – one that actively selects the talent Britain needs.

Collateral Damage

The political logic behind tighter migration policy is clear. The post-pandemic surge in net migration alienated voters across the political spectrum and exposed real weaknesses in the system. The public was right to expect control. Net migration approaching 1 million was not politically sustainable and no serious government could ignore the pressure it created. That pressure has been intensified by a wider debate dominated by irregular migration, small boats and asylum accommodation.

However, in the rush to bring numbers down, this government and the last have ended up catching all types of immigration in their sweep – including the high-skilled talent from overseas that drives economic growth. Well-targeted measures, such as the tightening of the Health and Care Worker visa, sit alongside collateral damage that was neither intended nor necessary.

That damage has fallen on the routes that matter most for growth. Quarterly issuance of Skilled Worker visas now stands at a little over 6,000 – a third of the level seen in 2024. And just 3,900 Global Talent visas were issued in 2025 – a figure barely changed from 2023 despite repeated promises to make the route more accessible. A route designed to attract exceptional researchers, technologists and entrepreneurs remains marginal in scale.

Cost is a major reason. The UK’s visa system is among the most expensive in the world. Bringing a mid-career professional to Britain on a Skilled Worker visa can cost a firm upwards of £13,000 before that person has started work. For people coming through the Global Talent visa, the frictions are also high: an endorsement process that can take months, plus fees and charges that mean a family of four can pay more than £21,000 for a five-year stay – with the Immigration Health Surcharge accounting for the largest share of that. This is not a minor irritant. To a globally mobile scientist, founder or engineer deciding between London and other international centres, the message is clear: Britain may want your contribution, but it will make you pay heavily for the privilege.

The UK has also dismantled two of its most important tools for attracting internationally mobile capital. The Tier 1 (Investor) visa – scrapped in 2022 – had serious flaws but has not been replaced, leaving Britain as one of the only major economies without a credible route for mobile investment. That gap has since been compounded by the abolition of the non-domicile regime in 2025, with nothing comparably attractive in its place. Nor is the picture settled – the proposed extension of the settlement qualifying period to ten years and live debates about wealth taxes add to the signal that globally mobile, high-value people are not especially welcome here.

A Race the UK Is Losing

Lower migration itself is not the same as controlled migration – and having one without the other comes with a cost.

The government has rightly focused on controlling potentially unproductive immigration – but that cannot come at the expense of productive immigration that drives growth. As we have argued in Taking the Brakes Off UK Growth: Building a More Dynamic Economy for a Faster World, in a fast-moving global economy, where technology drives rapid change, the ability to access the right talent quickly is itself a source of competitive advantage. Immigrants are also disproportionately a source of innovation: despite representing around 15 per cent of the population, they account for more than half of the founders of the UK’s 100 fastest-growing companies. The question immigration policy must answer is not how many people come – but who. At the moment, Britain’s system is falling short.

Britain is also becoming more restrictive just as the global market for talent is opening up. In the US, cuts to federal research funding and restrictions on work visas have shaken its position as the default destination for the world’s best. The European Research Council has seen applications from US-based researchers nearly triple in two years.

This is a specific, time-limited window of opportunity: people who uproot now will put down roots elsewhere. In 2025, the European Union launched a “Choose Europe for Science” initiative, now backed by nearly €900 million. Germany separately committed €600 million. France, Norway, Spain, Japan and Australia have all launched targeted schemes. The UK’s response – a £54 million Global Talent Fund – is welcome but dwarfed by its competitors and undermined by an unwelcoming immigration system. Britain – English-speaking, with world-class universities and deep capital markets – should be a natural destination in this race. It is not.

The Political Space Is Growing

The fall in net migration will create political space that did not previously exist. After the EU referendum in 2016, the salience of immigration as an issue fell from 45 per cent naming it a top concern to 10 per cent within three years, before a single policy had changed. As the numbers fall further, that dynamic is likely to repeat. Ministers have an opportunity to make a more sophisticated argument: Britain can be tough on abuse and low-value dependency while becoming more competitive for high-value talent, investment and strategic labour.

The government has shown it recognises the challenge, but the gap between intention and delivery is wide. The immigration white paper in May 2025 promised to simplify the Global Talent visa, while the industrial strategy identified access to global talent as central to the UK’s growth ambitions. But a year on, the substantive changes to high-talent routes amount to a clarification of fast-track endorsement criteria for academic roles and a new design pathway. These are useful, but they do not address the cost and complexity barriers that have long been identified as a core problem, while restrictions in other parts of the system – particularly on settlement periods – send the opposite signal to the globally mobile.

Part of what would make a more selective system politically sustainable is investing in the infrastructure to manage it with confidence. As TBI has argued in Time for Digital ID: A New Consensus for a State That Works, better use of digital ID and joined-up public-sector data would transform enforcement and give the government the confidence to be more open to high-skilled immigration, precisely because it is more in control across the board. But that is a medium-term project. There are quicker fixes available now.

Towards a Pro-Growth Immigration Policy

This government has consistently declared growth as its top priority. With numbers coming down, a parallel track should now open on immigration: one that sends a clear signal that Britain actively welcomes the globally mobile, the productive and the high-value. This need not be radical nor expensive.

The first priority is the Global Talent visa. Too small, too expensive and too cumbersome, it needs a streamlined endorsement process, expanded eligibility and lower, internationally competitive costs – starting with an exemption from the Immigration Health Surcharge. Britain should not require globally recognised researchers, founders and technologists to prove twice that they are exceptional: granting automatic eligibility for holders of equivalent visas such as the US O-1 or France’s Talent Passport would address this.

Second, the UK should replace the old investor visa with a reformed active-investment route focused on UK scale-ups, venture funds and productive assets, not passive asset-holding. At a time when the government wants to mobilise private investment into infrastructure, technology and industrial strategy, it makes little sense to have no credible route for internationally mobile investors.

Third, Britain needs a permanent Key Worker visa for essential roles where domestic supply consistently falls short. It should be a tightly governed workforce planning tool, linked to clear evidence of persistent shortages, sectoral need and domestic training commitments. That would be preferable to relying on temporary and uncertain shortage lists that leave employers unable to plan. Critical sectors need predictability.

Fourth, the UK should conclude an ambitious youth-mobility scheme with the EU. A reciprocal, time-limited arrangement, modelled on those with Canada or Australia, would help restore some of the flexibility lost to high-churn labour markets under Brexit without reopening free movement.

On the face of it, net migration at historic lows offers political relief. But the bigger prize is what comes next – a system that is more selective, more coherent and pro-growth. This commentary does not set out big asks. They are the minimum required to ensure that lower migration becomes the foundation for a better system – rather than a retreat from the world. That is what control should mean. The competition is not waiting. Nor should the government.