A new TBI report warns that the conditions which enabled rapid global vaccine access during Covid-19 will not hold in the next crisis. With supply increasingly shaped by geopolitics and national interest, vaccine manufacturing must be treated as critical national-security infrastructure – a core pillar of defence that saves lives, protects the economy and safeguards national autonomy.
The UK faces growing biological threats – from bioterrorism and antimicrobial resistance to climate-driven disease – and must strengthen domestic vaccine manufacturing to avoid dangerous reliance on foreign powers in an emergency.
New modelling shows that, without urgent action to reverse declining vaccine investment, a Covid-scale pandemic could cost the UK an additional 19,000 lives and £840 billion in lockdown-related losses. Even outside a pandemic, routine vaccine access is vulnerable to global shocks, including conflict and tariffs.
TBI is calling for permanent domestic-manufacturing readiness, stronger allied partnerships and targeted supply-chain investment to ensure rapid, independent response in a crisis.
New analysis from the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change warns that the UK is dangerously exposed to future biological shocks and must treat vaccine sovereignty as a central pillar of national security.
In an era of growing geopolitical fragmentation, strategic competition and supply-chain weaponisation, access to vaccines can no longer be viewed solely as a public-health issue – it is a matter of national resilience and state capability.
The report warns that the global environment that enabled rapid vaccine access during Covid-19 cannot be assumed to exist in the next crisis. Rising geopolitical tensions, export controls, trade fragmentation and vaccine nationalism mean that in a future emergency, supply may be dictated by national interest rather than global solidarity. Without credible domestic capability, the UK risks strategic dependency at precisely the moment it needs speed and autonomy.
Biological threats are growing in frequency, complexity and strategic relevance. Climate change is accelerating the spread of vector-borne diseases such as dengue and chikungunya into Europe. Antimicrobial resistance is increasing the risk of hard-to-treat outbreaks. At the same time, advances in biotechnology and artificial intelligence are lowering barriers to the misuse of biological agents. In such a landscape, preparedness is not optional insurance – it is a core responsibility of government.
TBI argues that vaccine-manufacturing capability should be treated as critical national-security infrastructure, comparable in importance to energy and food security, cyber-defence or defence industrial capacity. Countries with sovereign manufacturing muscle and political will can act decisively in a crisis; those without must negotiate, wait and absorb avoidable damage. That delay costs lives, weakens economic stability and erodes strategic credibility.
New modelling commissioned by TBI from Public First demonstrates the scale of the risk. A Covid-scale pandemic within the next decade, combined with a 25 per cent reduction (approximately £2.57 billion) in preparedness spending, would result in an additional 450,351 cases, 59,766 hospital admissions and 18,997 deaths, costing the NHS an estimated £254 million. The wider economic impact would reach approximately £840 billion – more than £100 billion more than the losses experienced in 2020.
In a world of heightened strategic rivalry, such vulnerability would not merely be a public-health failure; it would represent a significant national shock that adversaries could exploit. Reducing preparedness weakens deterrence, amplifies economic disruption and leaves the UK more exposed to coercion during moments of crisis.
By contrast, increasing preparedness spending by 25 per cent would materially reduce the health and economic consequences of a future pandemic, limiting borrowing, shortening disruption and strengthening national resilience. Sustained investment in vaccine research, regulation and manufacturing also anchors high-skilled jobs and reinforces the UK’s life-sciences base – a strategic asset in its own right.
TBI stresses that vaccine sovereignty does not mean isolation or full self-sufficiency, but strategic resilience: maintaining sufficient domestic manufacturing capability alongside strong allied partnerships and surge capacity so that, in a crisis, the UK can act rapidly and independently while remaining a reliable international partner.
To achieve this, the report calls for a hybrid approach that combines strengthened domestic capability with deeper collaboration among trusted allies, including:
Putting the UK on permanent pandemic standby
by coordinating its existing domestic manufacturing base which keeps vaccine manufacturing capacity warm and ready across multiple technologies – ensuring the country can scale up production fast when the next health emergency hits.
Working with trusted allies to strengthen the UK’s vaccine preparedness
by joining the EU FAB programme (a network of “ever-warm” vaccine manufacturing facilities) or leading the creation of a new Global FAB with a wider group of partners, including non-traditional allies. This would boost global surge capacity at relatively low cost, while spreading risk and reducing reliance on any single supply chain.
Fixing the weakest links in the UK’s vaccine-production capacity
by targeting investment at critical bottlenecks – such as fill-finish facilities, lipid-nanoparticle production and platform-specific upgrades – to crowd in private capital and deliver true end-to-end manufacturing capability.
Dr Charlotte Refsum, Director of Health Policy at the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, said:
“The geopolitical landscape has shifted markedly in recent years. We face a heightened risk of biological threats alongside growing volatility in global trade and supply chains. In this context, vaccine manufacturing is not simply a health-policy issue – it is a matter of national security and should be treated as a core component of the UK’s defence strategy.
“Vaccine sovereignty is ultimately a political choice: a recognition that investing in domestic capability and preparedness is a premium worth paying for resilience, speed and strategic autonomy. The UK cannot assume that global supply chains will hold during a crisis – or even that routine access to essential vaccines will remain uninterrupted in normal times.
“Without sustained investment now, we risk being slower to respond in an emergency, more exposed economically and more dependent on external actors for critical health infrastructure. Building and maintaining vaccine-manufacturing capacity, regulatory capability and a skilled workforce takes years – and cannot be done at speed once a crisis has already begun.”
“The report concludes that sustained, predictable investment in vaccine preparedness is essential to protecting lives, safeguarding the economy and strengthening the UK’s national security in an increasingly volatile world.”
Professor Sir Jonathan Van-Tam, former Deputy Chief Medical Officer at NHS England, said:
“The Covid-19 pandemic placed unprecedented strain on health systems in the UK and globally, leading to the loss of over 15 million lives. One of the clearest lessons was the importance of timely access to vaccines. Countries with established manufacturing and supply capacity were able to respond more quickly, while others experienced unavoidable delays. Those delays had significant consequences for public health.
“Strengthening vaccine development and manufacturing capability is a statement of national security. This is not simply a technical matter – it is essential for ensuring the UK can respond rapidly and effectively when the next health emergency arises. Sustained investment in preparedness is vital to protecting lives and minimising disruption during future outbreaks.”
Professor Seth Berkley, former CEO of Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, said:
“Pandemic preparedness is about day-zero capability. It’s about pre-financed manufacturing capacity, day-zero financing, clear legal pathways for liability, and trusted partnerships that have been tested before an outbreak – not promises made after it starts. Covid proved that while the science was more ready than ever before, operations and politics were not. Export bans, vaccine nationalism, fragmented supply chains and delayed finance slowed protection for those most at risk.
“Future outbreaks are an evolutionary certainty. The way to avoid dangerous delays is to pair credible domestic capacity with reliable international arrangements so doses move fast and fairly. Preparedness isn’t isolationism. It’s responsibility – to your own citizens and to the world.”