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Geopolitics & Security

How to Reform Immigration Without Leaving the EU


Commentary21st September 2017

As Theresa May prepares to set out her latest plan for Brexit in Florence on Friday, those on all sides of the debate will wait to see if there are answers to fundamental questions about Britain’s future outside of the EU. Principle among those is how the UK immigration system will work. How can we respond to leave voters’ concerns confidence in the system, whilst at the same time ensuring our economy isn’t badly damaged?

For those deeply concerned about Brexit, an important strategic objective is to challenge the basic premise of the Vote Leave campaign: that dealing with public’s concern about immigration means we have to leave the EU and Single Market.

In fact, the opposite is true. Last week the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change published our case for an alternative course of action not on offer from the main UK political parties. A paper I authored examined the evidence around EU migration and mapped out the most plausible policy options facing the UK in seeking to negotiate reform of free movement.

Our study found that we are more likely to be able to restore faith in the system by staying within Europe and reforming free movement, than by leaving. Here is how we could do it:

First, there are ways to exercise greater control over EU migration without needing to change the rules. It is not true that the current system of free movement is ‘unconditional’, as recently claimed in a leaked Home Office paper. In fact, there is already considerable scope under existing EU rules to limit free movement.

EU rules state that in order to be given a right to reside, EU migrants must be able to demonstrate proof that they are either working, actively seeking work, or self-sufficient, otherwise they can be proactively removed after three months.

But unlike other continental systems, the UK has chosen not to operate a worker registration system for EU nationals and thus has no way of tracking where they are or what they’re doing. This could be changed tomorrow, if the government were so minded.

Other reforms being discussed at the highest levels within Europe would help deal with the sense that those coming to the UK drive down wages and conditions. The UK could make common cause with President Macron in France, who is pushing for reform of the so-called ‘Posted Workers Directive’, so that companies seeking to bring in workers from abroad have to pay those workers at the same rate as local staff. It could also follow the advice of the TUC and implement domestic reforms of our labour market to prevent exploitation and undercutting.

Instead, the UK government has chosen to oppose reform of the Posted Workers Directive and made it clear that it has not interest in labour market reform.

“ 

Whilst the principle of free movement is a cornerstone of the European project, how it is applied in practice has evolved.

 ”

Geopolitics & Security

8th September 2017

Second, achieving more substantive change to free movement rules is not as implausible as often portrayed. Specifically, allowing member states to enact safeguards to slow the pace of change in local communities is not unrealistic. Whilst the principle of free movement is a cornerstone of the European project, how it is applied in practice has evolved. And given that other countries, such as France, have expressed concern and called for reform, it is likely to evolve further.

The reforms to free movement negotiated by David Cameron in 2016 illustrate that the EU Commission can be realistic. Cameron’s agreement (which focused primarily on benefits) also provides an important legal and political precedent, with the Commission having agreed to introduce ‘safeguards’ to respond to ‘situations of inflow of workers from other Member States of an exceptional magnitude over an extended period of time’.

Similar precedents can be found within a number of other EU agreements, including the Acts of Accession of new Member States, the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). OUR report recommends that the UK seek a strengthened version of Cameron’s ‘emergency brake’, which could be activated in the event of ‘exceptional inflows’ from within the EU. We are not the first to argue this.

Of course some will say that it is unrealistic to expect the UK to be able to get more than Cameron achieved in 2016. But put yourself if in the shoes of the EU. If you believe in a project and want it to succeed, moral imperative is balanced with realism and it hardly needs pointing out that the political context has radically shifted since Cameron’s negotiation.

In contrast, a ‘hard Brexit’ will not deliver the ‘control of our borders’ that Brexiteers have promised. As our report makes clear, the hospitality, food, manufacturing and social care sectors heavily depend on EU workers. Given current employment rates, this means huge labour shortages.

These shortages cannot be wished away with vague assertions about “rejoining the world” by the ultra free market Brexiteers. This is about looking after our elderly and putting food on our tables. If the UK leaves in April 2019, it is likely that the government will continue to want most categories of EU migration to continue. Moreover, whatever controls are introduced post-Brexit are unlikely to be enforced at the border (doing so would cause havoc, given our continued commitment to visa-free travel).  Instead we would be likely to see an upsurge in illegal migration from within the EU, with people arriving at the border as ‘visitors’ but then staying on to seek work. This is likely to worsen problems around integration, whereby migrants come and go in large numbers, without putting down roots.

We can do this a different way. The important issues that most drive public concern about EU migration - lack of control, undercutting, pace of change - can be dealt with either within current rules or by seeking reform within the EU.

The harsh truth is that Brexit is not only unlikely to deliver the control people want, it may actually undermine people’s faith in the system even further.

Some will argue that the entire line of argument contained here is dangerous, since it risks playing into an anti-immigrant narrative, rather than emphasising migration’s benefits. This is an argument for the ivory tower, not the real world.

There is a world of difference between pandering to prejudice and acknowledging that whilst EU migration has brought economic benefits to the UK, it has also created pressures, for example, relating to population churn within local communities.

The best way to secure public consent for free movement, in particular, and immigration in general, is to be clear about where those pressures manifest and find ways of dealing with them, consistent with keeping the UK within the EU.

This is neither an attempt at triangulation, nor impractical idealism. It’s about making sure we understand the consequences of one of the biggest decisions this country has ever taken, and considering a different course

Footnotes

  1. 1.

    Certainly this was true until 2016. Of course over the last year, net migration has begun to fall

  2. 2.

    Other causal factors include the declining value of Sterling

  3. 3.

    ONS, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report: May 2017. [These figures exclude students].

  4. 4.

    This chart requires a caveat: after the 2011 Census the ONS discovered that they undercounted A8 nationals by a substantial margin. Subsequently, they adjusted (i.e. increased) total net migration levels to reflect the undercount. However, there was no adjustment of the series by nationality. That means that for the 2004-2011 period EU net migration was actually higher than indicated by this figure. 

  5. 5.

    http://www.ier.org.uk/news/unison-collective-bargaining-prevents-employer-undercutting-wages-migrant-labour

  6. 6.

    OECD, International Migration Outlook, 2017

  7. 7.

    More recently, new exit check data has suggested that a much higher proportion of foreign students (97%) leave the UK after finishing their studies, implying total net migration may be lower than previously thought

     

  8. 8.

    Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, ONS (Aug 2017)

  9. 9.

    ‘Note on the difference between National Insurance number registrations and the estimate of long-term international migration: 2016, ONS (May 2016).

  10. 10.

    House of Commons Library Briefing, Migration Statistics, June 29 2017 (based on Labour Force Survey statistics)

     

  11. 11.

    It was reported in Dec 2016 that government ministers were privately lobbying the PM to allow low skilled migration from the EU to continue post- Brext http://news.sky.com/story/ministers-pressing-for-low-skilled-migration-to-continue-after-brexit-10682703 This position was made public by Brexit Secretary David Davis in Feb 2017 - “In the hospitality sector, hotels and restaurants, in the social-care sector, working in agriculture, it will take time -- it will be years and years before we get British citizens to do those jobs”. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-20/u-k-will-need-low-skilled-eu-migrants-after-brexit-davis-says

  12. 12.

    For a good summary of these issues, see Jonathan Portes, ‘Who are you calling low skilled?’ (April 2017)

  13. 13.

    BBC Newsnight (9 May 2017)

  14. 14.

    See evidence given to the Lords EU Committee by Andrew Green, Chair of Migration Watch (Feb 2017)

  15. 15.

    This table is based on Figure 13 of an April 2017 ONS release titled ‘International immigration and the labour market’ (link). The statistics for EU migrants as a whole were calculated by weighting the skill levels for each nationality group in the table by the number of people in that nationality group employed in the UK (which can be obtained from Table 2 of the same release).

     

  16. 16.

    EU immigrants are on average almost twice as likely to have some form of higher education than UK-born citizens (43% compared to 23%); CEP Brexit analysis No. 5

  17. 17.

    523,000 divided by the 5.567 million non-British nationals living in the UK. See ‘Population of the UK by Country of Birth and Nationality: 2015’ (ONS)

  18. 18.

    523,000 divided by the 3.159 million EU nationals living in the UK. Ibid

  19. 19.

    Even this figure may be an overestimate as it is likely the government will seek to negotiate bespoke carve-outs for particular sectors, where there is a clearly defined need for low skilled labour

  20. 20.

    Migration Advisory Committee, ‘Migrants in low skilled work’ (2014)  

  21. 21.

    National Institute of Economic and Social Research (2016)

  22. 22.

    Election 2015 briefing – migration and welfare benefits, Migration Observatory (May 2015)

  23. 23.

    T J Hatton, ‘Explaining trends in migration’ (2005)

  24. 24.

    See

    Strangers in their Own Land

    , a 2016 book by American sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild, for a rigorous academic treatment of how a sense of procedural unfairness can trump more objective metrics in causing public concern. 

  25. 25.

    The impact of migration on public services is not always straightforward. For example, research on the interaction between migration and NHS waiting times shows that in some cases, migration has actually

    lowered

    demand http://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/working-paper-series/working-paper-005

  26. 26.

    Asa Bennett, ‘Did Britain really vote Brexit to cut immigration?’ (29 June 2016)

  27. 27.

    Migration Observatory, ‘UK Public Opinion toward Immigration: Overall Attitudes and Level of Concern’ (November 2016)

  28. 28.

    NatCen, ‘Voters want UK to stay in the EU single market but be able to control immigration’ (16 No 2016)

  29. 29.

    British Social Attitudes: Immigration (June 2017)

  30. 30.

    ‘What next after Brexit?’, British Future (2016).

  31. 31.

    These figures apply almost as equally to Leave voters as they do to Remain voters. For example, just 15% of Leave voters want a reduction in highly skilled migration, compared to 85% who would prefer it to be increased (45%) or stay the same (40%). 

  32. 32.

    For example, see Stephen Clarke and Matthew Whittaker, ‘The importance of Place’ (Resolution Foundation, July 2016). Also research by Eric Kaufmann, ‘Trump and Brexit: why it’s again NOT the economy, stupid’ (9 November 2016). American researchers have also found pace of change was also a strong predictor of Trump support—see ‘Places Most Unsettled by Rapid Demographic Change Are Drawn to Donald Trump’ (Wall Street Journal, 1 November 2016).

  33. 33.

    Yougov poll commissioned by ‘Best for Britain’ (July 2017) https://blog.bestforbritain.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Best-for-Britain-Survey-Results_170627_Immigration.pdf

  34. 34.

    Conservative 2017 manifesto

  35. 35.

    In the year ending Dec 2016, inflows from the EU were 250,000, compared to inflows from outside the EU, which were 264,000 (ONS, Migration Statistics Quarterly Report, May 2017)

  36. 36.

    In oral evidence to the House of Commons Treasury Committee (19 Oct 2016), the Chancellor Phillip Hammond suggested that public concern about levels of migration related to ‘people competing for entry-level jobs with people in the UK’ and indicated that the government wish to reduce ‘the current dependency on low-cost migrant labour’ 

  37. 37.

    David Davis, (Hansard, Jan 24, 2017) https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/2017-01-24/debates/D423AEE6-BE36-4935-AD6A-5CA316582A9C/Article50

  38. 38.

    The analysis in this table is taken from Marley Morris, ‘Striking the right deal’: UK-EU migration and the Brexit negotiations’, IPPR (28 April 2017)

  39. 39.

    Even the issue of transition appears not to be collectively agreed. ‘Liam Fox denies Cabinet deal on transitional EU free movement’, Guardian (July 30 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jul/30/liam-fox-denies-cabinet-deal-on-transitional-eu-free-movement

  40. 40.

    The leaked memo states free movement will end in 2019, which in itself almost certainly rules out the scope for a period of negotiated transition with the EU27. Whilst the document leaves open the question of what a post-Brexit immigration system would look like, the overall tone suggests the HO is in favour of a more restrictive system overall https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/sep/05/the-draft-home-office-post-brexit-immigration-policy-document-in-full

  41. 41.

    Camino Mortera-Martinez and Christian Odendahl, ‘What free movement means to Europe and why it matters for Britain’ (Centre for European Reform, Jan 2017). It should be noted that these fears have often been conflated, often deliberately. An example would be the poster depicting queues of Syrian refugees unfurled by Nigel Farage during the 2016 UK Referendum 

  42. 42.

    http://www.thetimes.co.uk/ article/chancellor-to-banishgloom-for-trade-tour-q3fkjn3h5

  43. 43.

    ECFR’s World in 30 Minutes: Brexit - Views from Europe, 28 June 2016  

  44. 44.

    See Zsolt Darvas oral evidence to the House of Lords EU Committee (18 Jan, 2017) http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/eu-home-affairs-subcommittee/brexit-ukeu-movement-of-people/oral/45998.html  

  45. 45.

    ‘Essential principles on citizens’ rights’, EU Commission, 24 May 2017

  46. 46.

    ‘The United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union: safeguarding the position of EU citizens living in the UK and UK nationals living in the EU’ (June 26 2017), www.gov.uk 

  47. 47.

    ‘Improve the Brexit offer to EU citizens or we’ll veto the deal’, Guy Verhofstadt (the Guardian, 9 July 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jul/09/brexit-offer-eu-citzens-veto-british-porposal-european-parliament

  48. 48.

    ‘Labour makes dramatic shift and backs Single Market membership’, Guardian (Aug 26 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/global/2017/aug/26/labour-calls-for-lengthy-transitional-period-post-brexit 

  49. 49.

    ‘Macron and Merkel signal new move to strengthen Eurozone’, Guardian (15 May 2017) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/may/15/emmanuel-macron-angela-merkel-berlin-eurozone

  50. 50.

    Jean Pisani-Ferry, Norbert Rottgen, Andre Sapir, Paul Tucker, Guntram B. Wolff, ‘Europe after Brexit: a proposal for a Continental Partnership’ (Aug 2016)  

  51. 51.

    Analysis in this section draws on work by Marley Morris - ‘Striking the right deal: UK-EU migration after the Brexit negotiations’, IPPR (April 2017) and Sunder Katwala – ‘Britain’s immigration offer to Europe’ (Oct 2016)

  52. 52.

    https://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-centraleurope-idUSKCN1B41KQ

  53. 53.

    Macron: posted workers directive is a betrayal of the European spirit” http://www.brusselstimes.com/eu-affairs/8962/macron-posted-workers-directive-is-a-betrayal-of-the-european-spirit

  54. 54.

    http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_3.1.3.html

  55. 55.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/richard-bird/immigration-blame-the-uk-_b_13120104.html 

  56. 56.

    https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/nov/16/angela-merkel-brexit-free-movement-eu 

  57. 57.

    Marley Morris, ‘Striking the right deal: UK-EU migration and the Brexit negotiations’, IPPR (28 April 2017)

  58. 58.

    Marley Morris, ‘Striking the right deal: UK-EU migration and the Brexit negotiations’, IPPR, (April 28 2017)

  59. 59.

    Marley Morris, ‘Striking the right deal: UK-EU migration and the Brexit negotiations’, IPPR, (April 28 2017)

  60. 60.

    Statement by the European Commission on the capital controls imposed by the Republic of Cyprus (March 2013) http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-298_en.htm

  61. 61.

    Commissioning letter from the Home Secretary to the Migration Advisory Committee (July 2017) https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/633321/Commission_to_the_MAC.pdf 

  62. 62.

    See ‘Immigration: the manifesto challenge’, British Future (May 2017) http://www.britishfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Immigration-Manifesto-2017.-British-Future.pdf

  63. 63.

    Sadiq Khan, Evening Standard http://www.standard.co.uk/news/mayor/sadiq-khan-rapid-immigration-is-leading-to-communities-feeling-isolated-a3345791.html

  64. 64.

    See Palmer and Wood, ‘The politics of fantasy: immigration policy in the UK after Brexit’ (Jan 2017) http://www.civitas.org.uk/content/files/thepoliticsoffantasy.pdf

  65. 65.

    ‘UK public opinion toward immigration: overall attitudes and levels of concern’, Migration Observatory (Nov 2016) http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/uk-public-opinion-toward-immigration-overall-attitudes-and-level-of-concern/ 

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