Amid a wave of elections framed as existential, Moldova’s parliamentary contest stands out as one to watch. The vote, on 28 September, will determine whether the country stays on course to join the European Union or veers down a different path.
It comes at a difficult time in the region, marked by Moscow’s intensifying hybrid interference, Georgia’s suspension of EU accession talks and signs of renewed Russian offensives in Ukraine. Moldova itself has experienced a tumultuous 12 months, with pro-EU President Maia Sandu securing re-election and the narrow passage of a referendum to embed EU accession into the constitution. In Romania, record turnout by Moldovan dual citizens helped swing the presidential election towards pro-European candidate Nicușor Dan.
For Moldova’s ruling Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), the task ahead is to persuade an electorate impacted by economic pressures to stick with its European agenda. Moldova has made progress on aligning with EU laws and building institutional capacity, but major gaps remain and the toughest accession chapters lie ahead. Meanwhile, Moscow’s interference has exacerbated public scepticism. From disinformation to illicit funding, these efforts are likely to intensify as the election nears – challenging PAS as it works to maintain momentum on its European course.
PAS Faces a Difficult Fight
Founded as a pro-EU and anti-corruption platform in 2016, Sandu’s party PAS has governed alone since its landslide 2021 election victory, when it secured 63 out of 101 parliamentary seats. It has faced significant tests in office, including Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and the arrival of more than a million refugees, Moscow’s sustained efforts to use Moldova’s energy dependence as leverage and global economic headwinds.
Amid this backdrop, the government has pursued a reform agenda, advancing judicial vetting, improvements to public digital services and several major infrastructure projects aimed at driving growth while increasing energy and trade independence. Yet the environment remains difficult. The economy has entered a technical recession due to energy imports, utility prices have increased by 20 to 40 per cent amid the shift away from Russian gas (although many citizens receive subsidies) and progress on judicial reform has been slow, leaving numerous vacancies in the system.
Although GDP per capita has improved slightly under PAS, it remains among the lowest in Europe, and recent polling indicates voters rank poverty and economic issues among their chief concerns. Preliminary GDP numbers for the first quarter of 2025 show negative year-on-year growth for the third quarter in a row.
Some of this is down to external factors; the Ukraine war has pushed up energy, freight and fertiliser costs, fuelled inflation and impacted investor confidence. Agricultural exports are facing climate-related impacts, heavy industry in the breakaway region of Transnistria has been hit by the loss of free Russian gas and the US trade war has affected light industry in areas controlled by Chișinău. Some factors fall within the government’s remit, however, such as farm subsidies that hamper the development of a diversified, modern agrifood sector, multiple legacy state-owned enterprises that are inefficient (or even de-facto defunct), regulatory constraints that serve as a drag on manufacturing, and the continued exodus of skilled workers that imperils growth in the competitive services and IT sectors.
Energy policy has emerged as a contentious issue. Difficult steps taken by the government to mitigate the Kremlin’s energy blackmail have come at a high cost for both households and business. Opposition parties may argue for a more conciliatory strategy that promises lower prices, but without peace in Ukraine these are largely spurious promises.
Politically, PAS remains isolated in its comprehensively pro-EU stance. Other minor pro-EU parties exist but are not widely supported. This leaves PAS with three key problems:
Given it dominates the pro-European space, there is little internal competition to sharpen policy ideas, which could ultimately weaken the party’s offering to voters.
The absence of another credible pro-EU voice allows critics to link EU membership with Moldova’s deep-rooted economic challenges – such as uncompetitive state-owned enterprises, ongoing judicial-reform challenges and low wages – and leaves pro-EU voters without a political alternative.
If PAS falls short of an absolute majority, it has no natural coalition partner.
Spotlight
Parties in Moldova can run independently or form electoral blocs to clear the threshold for its proportionally elected parliament. In this election, the most viable parties/blocs can be grouped into four camps:
The most explicitly pro-Kremlin faction, Victory Bloc, was established in Moscow in 2024 and is linked to fugitive banker Ilan Shor. Its parties openly oppose EU integration and advocate for federalisation, a model that would grant veto powers to regions such as Gagauzia (an autonomous territorial unit) and Transnistria. This proposed structure echoes earlier Kremlin-backed plans for Ukraine and Moldova, and would likely hinder effective governance. Parties in this bloc tap into anti-elite populism and disillusionment with pro-European leaders for support. Several of the bloc’s prominent figures, including Gagauzia Governor Evghenia Guțul, MP and party secretary Marina Tauber and the bloc’s parliamentary leader Vasile Bolea, currently face legal challenges. On 19 July, Victory Bloc’s application for registration in this year’s elections was rejected by the Electoral Commission due to administrative deficiencies and for having member parties that had previously subverted the constitutional order. The bloc and some of its members have also recently been sanctioned by the EU for undermining sovereignty and the rule of law in Moldova. Recent polls put Victory at around 6 to 10 per cent; these votes would likely transfer to other pro-Kremlin parties if the commission’s decision is upheld in court.
The “sovereigntists” want Moldova to take a more friendly position towards Russia while maintaining relations with the West. The Bloc of Communists and Socialists (which currently has 26 seats) combines socially conservative views with a left-wing economic agenda. Parties in this bloc previously suggested leaving the EU Association Agreement and supported a boycott of the EU referendum, but have recently moved towards lukewarm support for EU membership. On 22 July, the Party of Socialists, the Party of Communists, the Heart of Moldova Party and the Future of Moldova Party agreed to form an electoral bloc for the upcoming election. This bloc will likely place second – capturing 20 per cent or more of the vote – and may overperform with its electoral promise of cheap energy through better relations with Russia.
The new Alternativa Bloc also seeks a less antagonist relationship with Russia while opposing the war in Ukraine and describing itself as pro-European. It includes Chișinău Mayor Ion Ceban, former Prime Minister Ion Chicu, former Communist Party lawmaker Mark Tkaciuk, and former prosecutor general and presidential candidate Alexandr Stoianoglo. Several of its members have previously been affiliated with the Communist, Socialist or Ilan Shor-linked parties. Ceban was recently banned from Romania and the EU’s Schengen area by Romania’s security agencies, who cited “national security concerns”. Stoianoglo polled strongly in the 2024 presidential race.
Our Party, led by Renato Usatîi, has built support in Moldova’s north through blunt, populist messaging. Usatîi, who has professional and personal ties to both Russia and Romania, has condemned the invasion of Ukraine and publicly distanced himself from other pro-Russian politicians. He is positioning himself as an alternative to both PAS and Kremlin-aligned parties, and could become a kingmaker in coalition talks, assuming the party can clear the 5 per cent threshold needed to enter parliament.
Moscow’s Interference Will Intensify
In 2024, Moldova faced a surge in Kremlin-backed destabilisation: orchestrated vote-buying, illicit funding of politicians, cyber-attacks on the electoral commission, and disinformation campaigns across social media and Russian television. These operations are expected to intensify. Moscow’s aim is not only to influence electoral outcomes but to undermine institutional trust, delay Moldova’s reforms and ultimately push it off the pathway to EU accession.
Romania’s recent presidential election serves as a warning of the way in which hybrid tactics can lead to a contested result, and to greater polarisation of voters. Institutions such as the electoral commission, the police, prosecutors and the Constitutional Court will need to be prepared, as will the current government.
Three Post-Election Scenarios
Three key scenarios could emerge from the election, each with important implications for Moldova and beyond.
A PAS majority would allow reforms and alignment with the EU acquis (the common laws, rights and obligations that member states adopt) to continue, but the bar is high. Delivering on the €1.9 billion Reform and Growth Facility, which ties EU financial support to reform milestones over the next three years, and advancing through the acquis will demand sustained focus. Reform fatigue, slow progress or bottlenecks absorbing EU funding and capacity support could erode public backing and provide openings for populist challengers. Kremlin interference will escalate and test the government’s resolve.
A PAS-led coalition would require compromises. Cabinet roles might be used to entice coalition partners with divergent interests. The potential risk is that reform initiatives could be watered down to avoid conflict, slowing progress towards EU membership.
A government excluding PAS would signal a shift in tone. Such a government would likely balance outward support for EU accession with the desire of some coalition members to rebuild relations with Russia. Some parties have previously supported measures such as a foreign-agent law or tighter controls on NGOs and media; these could re-emerge in coalition negotiations. This kind of agenda could trigger EU safeguards in the Reform and Growth Facility, putting some of the €1.9 billion investment at risk. In the absence of strong political support, it is likely some of the more difficult chapters in the accession talks – including those on agriculture, competition policy and justice that present complex legal and policy challenges that will require resourcing, technical capabilities and internal compromise – would be delayed, potentially putting Moldova into a membership holding pattern that could derail its European ambitions.
Polling from May shows that more than 60 per cent of voters support EU membership and nearly 40 per cent back PAS (excluding undecideds and diaspora voters). These numbers are encouraging but may still fall short of delivering a majority. Diaspora turnout, which has previously favoured PAS, could prove decisive in determining whether PAS can regain a majority. If not, the Alternativa Bloc – or, less likely, Our Party – could be well placed to shape a coalition government (with or without PAS).
A Defining Choice
These elections are important for the country, for the region, for Europe and beyond, and will have a direct impact on Moldova’s ability to continue with EU accession. President Sandu and PAS have managed EU politics well and Brussels has created a pathway for EU membership. The Kremlin will be hoping to force Moldova off this path and has succeeded in bolstering public disaffection with the process. The choice ahead is whether Moldova stays the course towards EU membership – and that rests not only with its politicians, but with its voters and the institutions charged with upholding their will.